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Abstract
This paper develops a secure distributed constraint satisfaction algorithm. A Distributed Constraint
Satisfaction Problem (DisCSP) is a constraint satisfaction problem in which variables and constraints
are distributed among multiple agents. A major motivation for solving a DisCSP without gathering
all information in one server is the concern about privacy/security. However, existing DisCSP algo-
rithms leak some information during the search process, and privacy/security issues are not dealt with
formally. Our newly developed algorithm utilizes a public key encryption scheme. In this algorithm,
multiple servers, which receive encrypted information from agents, cooperatively perform a search
process that is equivalent to a standard chronological backtracking algorithm. This algorithm does
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not leak any private information on the obtained solution, i.e., neither agents nor servers can obtain
any additional information on the value assignment of variables that belong to other agents.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DisCSP) is a constraint satisfaction
problem in which variables and constraints are distributed among multiple agents. Since
various application problems in multi-agent systems can be formalized as DisCSPs, there
have been many works on this topic in the last decade [4,8,12,20,26–29].
One major motivation for solving a DisCSP without gathering all information in one
server is the concern about privacy/security, i.e., the knowledge of the problem each agent
has is private information and revealing such information to a server or other agents is
not desirable. Consequently, we cannot gather all information in a single server and solve
the problem by using centralized CSP techniques. In a DisCSP, a variable value can be
considered as an action/plan that an agent will take. It is natural that an agent does not
want to reveal information on possible plans or the final plan it will take to other agents.
For example, the problem of scheduling multiple meetings among multiple participants
can be formalized as a DisCSP as follows. Each agent/participant has one variable that
corresponds to each meeting. The domain of the variable includes possible dates and time
slots. There exist equality constraints among variables that represent the same meeting and
belong to different agents (i.e., they must meet at the same day/time). Also, there exist
inequality constraints between multiple variables that belong to the same agent (i.e., a
person cannot attend multiple meetings at the same time). Furthermore, an agent has unary
constraints on its variables (i.e., he/she has personal schedules that prevent him/her from
attending a meeting). In this problem domain, it is clear that a person would not be happy
to make such private information public.
However, existing DisCSP algorithms leak some information during the search process,
and privacy/security issues have not yet been dealt with formally. For example, in the asyn-
chronous backtracking algorithm [28], each agent exchanges a tentative value assignment
with other agents. If the current assignment does not satisfy the constraints, these agents
change their assignments and perform backtracking in a certain order. During this search
process, an agent can obtain some information on possible values of the variables that be-
long to the other agents. In addition, an agent can learn the final value assignment of these
variables.
When applying this algorithm to the meeting scheduling problem, we can assume that
each agent makes proposals on the date and time slot of the meeting and negotiates with
other agents. The fact that an agent proposes a certain date reveals that he/she does not
have any personal schedule on that date. If an agent declines a certain date, this means that
he/she has a personal schedule or the date conflicts with some other meeting. Such private
information is leaked during the search process.
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On the other hand, in the research community on information security and cryptography,
there have been many works on multi-party protocols, which deal with performing various
computations based on the private information of participants, while keeping this infor-
mation secret [5,17]. However, as far as the authors are aware, there has been virtually no
work on solving combinatorial optimization problems (including CSPs as a special case)
by utilizing information security techniques, with the notable exception of the authors’
recent works on secure dynamic programming [18,24,30].
It is well known that any combinatorial circuit can be computed securely by using
general-purpose multi-party protocols [1,5]. Also, in [9], a secure meeting scheduling pro-
tocol for a single meeting is presented. In this paper, we develop a secure DisCSP algorithm
that utilizes information security techniques. Our goal is to develop a specialized method
for solving DisCSPs so that it is more efficient than general-purpose multi-party protocols.
Also, the DisCSP formalization is much more general than the problem addressed in [9].
In this paper, we say that an algorithm does not leak any private information if an agent
cannot obtain any additional information on the value assignment of variables that belong
to other agents. In a meeting scheduling application, this means that each participant cannot
know the scheduled dates of the meetings he/she will not attend. Also, he/she cannot obtain
any information on the private schedules of other participants.
In our newly developed secure DisCSP algorithm, multiple computational servers are
used to implement a standard chronological backtracking algorithm; thus, this algorithm
is guaranteed to be complete. Each agent only knows the value assignment of its own
variables and cannot obtain any additional information on the value assignment of variables
that belong to other agents. Also, computational servers cannot get any information on the
value assignment of any variable.
In the rest of this paper, we first show the formal definition of DisCSP and secure al-
gorithms (Section 2). Next, we describe a public key encryption scheme, which is a basic
tool used in our secure DisCSP algorithm (Section 3). Then, we describe the details of our
newly developed secure DisCSP algorithm (Section 4). Finally, we examine the character-
istics of this algorithm (Section 5) and discuss related works (Section 6).
2. Formalization
A DisCSP can be formalized as follows.
• There exist agents 1,2, . . . , I .
• There exist variables x1, x2, . . . , xn. Each variable belongs to one agent. The fact that
xi belongs to agent a is represented as belongs(xi, a).
• All variables have a common domain {1,2, . . . ,m}. This domain of variables is com-
mon knowledge among agents.
• There exist unary constraints on one variable and binary constraints between two vari-
ables.
• We assume constraints are represented as nogoods. A unary nogood {xi = di} rep-
resents the fact that the value assignment di to variable xi violates the constraint.
A binary nogood {xi = di, xj = dj } represents the fact that the assignment of xi = di
and xj = dj violates the constraint.
232 M. Yokoo et al. / Artificial Intelligence 161 (2005) 229–245Fig. 1. Distributed 4-queen problem.
• These constraints are the private information of agents. More specifically, the unary
constraints on xi , which belongs to agent a, are known only by agent a. Let us denote
a set of these unary constraints as Caxi . Also, the binary constraints between xi and xj ,
which belong to agent a and agent b, respectively, are distributed between agents a and
b. Let us denote the constraints agent a knows as Caxi,xj and the constraints agent b
knows as Cbxi ,xj .• A solution of DisCSP D = {x1 = d1, x2 = d2, . . . , xn = dn} is a value assignment of
all variables that satisfies all unary and binary constraints.
Let us show an example. Fig. 1 shows an example of the well-known n-queen problem,
where n = 4. If we assume there exists an agent that corresponds to a queen of each row
and these queens try to find their positions so that they do not kill each other, this problem
can be formalized as a DisCSP. We call this problem the distributed 4-queen problem.
More specifically, there are four agents 1,2,3,4. Each agent i has one variable xi with
domain {1,2,3,4}. In this problem, there is no unary constraint. Let us assume that for
i < j , Cixi,xj , i.e., the constraint agent i knows, consists of diagonal constraints, e.g., C
1
x1,x2
contains nogood {x1 = 1, x2 = 2}, etc., and Cjxi ,xj consists of column constraints, e.g.,
C2x1,x2 contains nogood {x1 = 1, x2 = 1}, etc.
This formalization is based on the traditional definition introduced by [27,28]. One mi-
nor difference is that in [27,28], it is assumed that the domain of a variable is different and
the domain is private information, while in our formalization, the entire domain is com-
mon knowledge but an agent can have private unary constraints. These two formalizations
are mutually interchangeable and there is no significant difference between them. More
specifically, if domains of variables are different, we can simply assume the entire com-
mon domain is just a union of domains of all variables, and each agent has unary constraints
for values it cannot choose. Another slight difference is that in [27,28], binary constraints
between variables xi and xj are assumed to be the common knowledge of agents a and b,
who own these variables. This is a special case of our definition where Caxi ,xj and C
b
xi,xj
are identical.
In [20], an alternative formalization of DisCSP is presented in which variables and do-
mains are common knowledge and constraints are private information. Our formalization
is based on [28], i.e., the constraints an agent has are restricted to those that are related to
its own variables.
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We define the fact that when solving a DisCSP using a particular algorithm, the algo-
rithm does not leak private information of an agent to other agents as follows. This is a
special case of the simulatability model described in [13].
• After a solution is found, each agent has the same knowledge on the assignment of
other agents as the case where the agent obtains (a part of) the solution directly from
an oracle without performing the algorithm.
More specifically, let us denote an assignment of any subset of k variables as Dk =
{xj1 = dj1, xj2 = dj2, . . . , xjk = djk }. Also, let us define pa(Dk) as the estimated prob-
ability of agent a, in that the final solution is a superset of Dk after a solution is
found by performing the algorithm. Also, let us define poraclea (Dk) as the estimated
probability of agent a, in that the final solution is a superset of Dk , after obtain-
ing the value assignment of its own variables from the oracle. This definition means
pa(Dk) = poraclea (Dk) for all Dk .
When obtaining the value assignment of its own variables from the oracle, the agent ob-
tains certain information on the value assignment of other variables. For example, assume
x1 belongs to agent a and x2 belongs to agent b. If agent a knows there exists an inequality
constraint between x1 and x2, agent a can infer that pa({xj = di}) = 0 if xi is assigned
to di . Also, if there exists an equality constraint, agent a can infer that pa({xj = di}) = 1.
The above condition means that the algorithm does not leak any unnecessary information,
i.e., no additional information is leaked besides the information that can be inferred by
obtaining a part of the solution.
Furthermore, if an algorithm requires a third party other than the agents who originally
have variables (we call such an actor a server), we define the fact that when solving a
DisCSP using a particular algorithm, the algorithm does not leak any private information
of an agent to a server as follows.
• A server has no knowledge on the obtained solution after performing the algo-
rithm. More specifically, for an assignment of any subset of k variables Dk = {xj1 =
dj1, xj2 = dj2, . . . , xjk = djk }, let us denote the estimated probability of a server, in
that the obtained solution is a superset of Dk , as pserver(Dk). This definition means
pserver(Dk) = 1/mk , where k is the number of variables in Dk . This condition means
all assignments look equally probable to a server.
This condition requires that a server cannot learn any unary/binary constraints.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we describe a basic tool for our implementation, i.e., an indistinguish-
able, homomorphic, and randomizable public key encryption scheme. In the rest of this
paper, we use ElGamal encryption [2], which has all of these properties, for describing our
algorithm. However, our algorithm can be implemented using other encryption methods
(e.g., Paillier encryption [15]) that also have these properties.
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Public key encryption. In public key encryption, the key used for encryption is public, so
anybody can create ciphertext E(M) from plaintext M . On the other hand, the key used
for decryption is kept secret and only the one who has the secret key can obtain M from
E(M).
ElGamal encryption. ElGamal encryption is one instance of public key encryption. Let
q,p = 2q + 1 be primes and G = 〈g〉 ⊂ Z∗p be a cyclic group of order q generated by g,
where Zp denotes a set of integers from 0 to p − 1 and Z∗p denotes a set of integers that
are in Zp and prime to p. The secret key is s ∈ Zq and the corresponding public key is
g,y = gs .
ElGamal encryption is based on the assumption of the hardness of the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP), i.e., to find s from (g, gs ) is computationally infeasible. Please note that
we use modulo p arithmetic.
Anyone can encrypt message M ∈ G just by using the public key g,y = gs , i.e., choose
random number r ∈ Zq and create ElGamal ciphertext E(M) = (A = gr ,B = yrM).
Someone who knows the secret key, s ∈ Zq , can decrypt ciphertext E(M) = (A = gr ,B =
yrM), i.e., compute B/As = M .
Let us show a very simple example.
– System parameters: p = 23, g = 3.
– Public keys: y = 9.
– Secret key: s = 2.
Please note that this setting is intended only to show a simple, easy to follow explanation;
p is too small and obtaining secret key s from the public keys is easy. In standard settings,
p is chosen from about 1024 primes. Please refer to [11] for more details on ElGamal
encryption.
For encrypting plaintext 5, if we choose random value r = 2, we obtain ciphertext
E(5) = (g2, y2M) = (32 mod 23,92 ·5 mod 23) = (9,14). For decrypting E(5) = (9,14),
we can obtain 14/92 mod 23 = 14/12 mod 23 = 5.
We also have elliptic curve ElGamal encryption [10,14], that is ElGamal encryption
using an additive group of rational points on an elliptic curve over a finite field instead
of a multiplicative group Z∗p used in usual ElGamal encryption. We can use a smaller
finite field, about 160-bit, in the elliptic curve ElGamal encryption rather than multiplica-
tive group Z∗p, about 1024-bit, in usual ElGamal encryption, since we have no quasi-
exponential attack against DLP over elliptic curve while we have quasi-exponential attack
against DLP in Z∗p known as index calculus [7]. By using elliptic curve ElGamal encryp-
tion, we can reduce the costs of communication and computation.
Indistinguishable encryption. E is IND-CPA (indistinguishable against chosen plaintext
attack) iff no adversary can guess b ∈ {0,1} with probability greater than one half from
(M0,M1,E(Mb)) where M0, M1 are selected by the adversary and the adversary can
adaptively obtain a ciphertext of a plaintext chosen by itself. This means that the ciphertext
E(M) leaks no information about plaintext M . Please refer to [6] for a more formal defi-
nition. If we assume that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [22] is infeasible,
ElGamal encryption E is IND-CPA [25].
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A more intuitive explanation is as follows. In ElGamal encryption, E(M) is created
using random number r . Thus, if the same plaintext is encrypted twice using different ran-
dom numbers, these two ciphertexts look totally different and it is difficult to tell whether
the original plaintexts are the same or not.
For example, if we choose random value r = 6 for encrypting plaintext 5, we obtain ci-
phertext E(5) = (g6, y6M) = (36 mod 23,96 ·5 mod 23) = (16,15). This ciphertext looks
totally different from another ciphertext E(5) = (9,14).
Homomorphic encryption. An encryption E is homomorphic if E(M1)E(M2) =
E(M1M2) holds. If we define the product of ciphertexts E(M1) = (A1,B1) and E(M2) =
(A2,B2) by E(M1)E(M2) = (A1A2,B1B2), ElGamal encryption E is homomorphic en-
cryption. By using this property, we can obtain the product of two plaintexts by taking the
product of two ciphertexts without decrypting them.
For example, given E(5) = (9,14) and E(5) = (16,15), we can obtain E(5 · 5 mod
23 = 2) = (9 · 16 mod 23,14 · 15 mod 23) = (6,3). Note that this operation can be done
without decrypting these ciphertexts. By decrypting (6,3), we can obtain 3/62 mod 23 =
3/13 = 2.
Randomization. In ElGamal encryption, one can create a new randomized ciphertext
E(M) = (Agr ′,Byr ′) with a random value r ′ from the original ciphertext E(M) = (A =
gr ,B = yrM). This is equivalent to making a product of E(1) = (gr ′ , yr ′) and E(M). If
we assume that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is infeasible, one cannot
determine whether a ciphertext is a randomized ciphertext of the original ciphertext or not.
For example, given E(5) = (9,14) and E(1) = (8,18), where r = 10, the resulting
product is E(5)E(1) = E(5) = (9 · 8 mod 23,14 · 18 mod 23) = (3,22). E(5) = (9,14)
and E(5) = (3,22) look totally different, so we cannot know whether the original plain-
texts are the same or not without decrypting them.
Multiple servers. By utilizing secret sharing techniques, we can make each server have
only a share of the secret key; thus, any collusion of t (or fewer than t) servers cannot
decrypt E [17].
In the preparation phase, the secret key s and the public key y are generated in a distrib-
uted way [16] and each distributed server has only a share of the secret key. The decryption
is performed in a distributed fashion by each distributed server that has a share of the secret
key.
For example, let us consider the simplest case where the total number of servers is
two and t = 1, i.e., there are servers 1 and 2. If these two servers cooperate, they can
decrypt E while a single server cannot. Servers 1 and 2 generate their own shares of the
secret keys s1, s2, respectively. The secret key is s = s1 + s2 (modq), but neither server
knows s. They exchange y1 = gs1 and y2 = gs2 with each other and obtain public key
y = y1 · y2 = gs1+s2 = gs .
When decrypting E(M) = (A = gr ,B = yrM), these servers calculate As1 and As2 and
exchange the results with each other. Then, by calculating B/(As1 · As2) = B/As1+s2 =
B/As , these servers can obtain the plaintext M . Note that the secret key s is kept secret
236 M. Yokoo et al. / Artificial Intelligence 161 (2005) 229–245
to these servers even after the decryption; they need to cooperate again to decrypt another
ciphertext.
4. Secure DisCSP algorithm
In this section, we show the details of our newly developed algorithm. When describing
our algorithm, we make the following assumptions for notational simplicity.
• Each agent i has exactly one variable xi .
• There exist binary constraints between all pairs of variables.
Relaxing these assumptions and extending the algorithm to general cases is rather straight-
forward. If an agent has multiple variables, we can simply assume the agent has one
combined variable, whose domain is the product of domains of original variables. Also,
if a constraint is not binary but among k variables, the constraint matrix described in Sec-
tion 4.2 becomes k-dimensional.
4.1. Basic ideas
In our newly developed secure DisCSP algorithm, computational servers called a
search-controller and decryptors are used. There exist multiple (at least two) decryptors.
Each of these decryptors has a share of the secret key of E as described in Section 3,
and public key y for E is generated by these decryptors distributedly. There exists one
search-controller.
The main search procedure is performed by the search-controller. Each agent first
encodes unary/binary constraints and passes the information to the servers. Then, these
servers obtain a solution and return the value assignment to each agent. By utilizing these
servers, we can guarantee that the information each agent can get is the same as the case
where the agent obtains its value assignment directly from an oracle.
On the other hand, when utilizing servers, we must make sure that they do not obtain
any information of the obtained solution. In our secure DisCSP algorithm, this requirement
is satisfied by introducing the following methods: (1) constraints are encoded by using a
public key encryption scheme, (2) agents cooperatively perform renaming/permutation of
variable values, (3) these servers cooperatively solve the problem without directly decrypt-
ing the constraints.
Fig. 2 shows the flow of the proposed algorithm. In the rest of this section, we describe
the details of these procedures.
4.2. Encoding constraints
Each agent needs to encode its unary/binary constraints so that subsequent renam-
ing/permutation is possible and so that the search-controller cannot understand but de-
cryptors can cooperatively decrypt.
M. Yokoo et al. / Artificial Intelligence 161 (2005) 229–245 237Fig. 2. Flow of secure DisCSP algorithm.
To satisfy this goal, agent i represents its binary constraints between xi and xj , i.e.,
Cixi,xj , using an m × m constraint matrix. We denote this matrix as Ai,xi ,xj (we assume
i < j ). An element of this matrix Ai,xi ,xj (k, l) is defined as follows. E(1) and E(z) denote
the encryption of 1 and a common public element z ( = 1), respectively. z should be an
element of order q . We also assume 2(n − 1) < q holds. Therefore, zc mod p = 1 holds
for all c, where 0 < c < q .
• Ai,xi ,xj (k, l) = E(z) if xi = k and xj = l are inconsistent, i.e., nogood{xi = k, xj = l}
is in Cixi ,xj , or k violates i’s unary constraint, i.e., nogood{xi = k} is in Cixi .• Ai,xi ,xj (k, l) = E(1) if xi = k and xj = l are consistent.
Fig. 3 shows constraint matrices for x1 and x2, encoded by agent 1 and agent 2 in the
distributed 4-queen problem. Note that agent 1 knows the diagonal constraints between x1
and x2, and agent 2 knows the column constraints between x1 and x2. The element in the
kth row, lth column is filled by E(z) if x1 = k and x2 = l is a nogood (otherwise it is filled
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by E(1)). As described in Section 3, E(z) (or E(1)) looks totally different, so we cannot
know whether the original plaintexts are the same or not without decrypting them.
Then, from Ai,xi ,xj and Aj,xi,xj , agent i and agent j obtain a new matrix Axi,xj , where
each element Axi,xj (k, l) is given as Ai,xi ,xj (k, l) · Aj,xi ,xj (k, l) (Fig. 3). As described in
Section 3, E is homomorphic. Therefore, we can calculate the product of two elements
without decrypting them.
4.3. Renaming/permutation
Next, agents perform the permutation of rows/columns on each constraint matrix. This
means that agents transform the original problem into a new problem in which variable
values are renamed. More specifically, for each variable xi , its value k is renamed as
πxi (k), where πxi is a permutation of m elements, i.e., a bijective map from {1,2, . . . ,m}
to {1,2, . . . ,m}. By utilizing randomization, we cannot know the result of the permutation
even if we compare the matrices before and after the permutation.
The detailed procedure is as follows.
• For each Axi,xj , agent i first applies the permutation function πxi (·) to the rows and
sends the result to agent j , where each element of the matrix is randomized by multi-
plying E(1).
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• Next, agent j applies the permutation function πxj (·) to the columns and sends the
randomized result to the search-controller.
Fig. 4 shows the result of the permutation, where πx1(1) = 2, πx1(2) = 4, πx1(3) = 1,
πx1(4) = 3, πx2(1) = 3, πx2(2) = 1, πx2(3) = 4, and πx2(4) = 2.
4.4. Search procedure
In this section, we show the search procedure performed by the search-controller and
decryptors. The search-controller controls the search process and the decryptors perform
decryption.
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Partial_Solution ← {};
j ← 1;
SELECT-VARIABLE:
if j = n + 1
then inform each agent of the current value assignment;
terminate the procedure;
else l ← 1;
CHECK:
P ←∏(xi ,k)∈Partial_Solution Axi ,xj (k, l);
for P = (A,B), send A to each decryptor j and wait for Asj .
if B/(
∏
j A
sj ) is 1
then add (xj , l) to Partial_Solution, j ← j + 1;
goto SELECT-VARIABLE;
else if l = m
then goto BACKTRACK;
else l ← 1 + l; goto CHECK;
end if; end if; end if;
BACKTRACK:
if Partial_Solution is empty
then announce that there exists no solution;
terminate the procedure;
else j ← j − 1; remove (xj , l′) from Partial_Solution;
if l′ = m
then goto BACKTRACK;
else l ← l′ + 1; goto CHECK;
end if; end if;
Fig. 5. Procedure for search-controller.
4.4.1. Procedure for search-controller
Fig. 5 shows the procedure for the search-controller. The search-controller performs the
described search procedure, which is equivalent to a standard chronological backtracking.
Partial_Solution represents a set of variables that are in a partial solution. All constraints
among variables within the partial solution are satisfied. If a variable that is not in the partial
solution does not satisfy a constraint with a variable in the partial solution, the search-
controller tries the next value. If there is no other value, then the value of the variable that
was most recently added to the partial solution is changed (backtracking).
In the procedure described in Fig. 5, if all constraints are satisfied, then P is E(1), oth-
erwise, P is E(zc), where c is the number of violated constraints, since E is homomorphic.
Also, since z is an element of order q and 2(n − 1) < q , zc will not be equal to 1.
4.4.2. Procedure for decryptors
Each decryptor j has a share of secret key s, i.e., sj , where s =∑j sj (modq). The
number of decryptors depends on the required level of security, i.e., by using t + 1 de-
cryptors, even if t (or fewer than t) decryptors collude to obtain the private information of
agents, they cannot decrypt the constraint matrices directly.
When the search-controller wants to decrypt E(M) = (A,B), the search-controller
sends A to each decryptor j , then the decryptor calculates Asj and sends the result to
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the search controller. By calculating B/
∏
j A
sj = B/As , the search-controller can obtainM .
4.4.3. Obtaining a solution
When a solution of the renamed problem is obtained, the search-controller sends the
current assignment to each agent. If agent i knows the renamed value for xi is di , it can
obtain the original value π−1xi (di), which is a part of the final solution. For example, if the
search-controller obtains a solution, in which the value assignment of x1 is 1, it sends this
assignment to agent 1. Since agent 1 knows πxi (3) = 1, it can obtain that x1 = 3 is a part
of the final solution.
5. Algorithm characteristics
5.1. Security
It is clear that this algorithm does not leak any additional information to other agents.
Since the constraint matrices are encrypted, an agent cannot get any information during
the permutation phase. An agent does not participate in the search phase. Therefore, the
information an agent can get is the same as the case where the agent obtains a part of the
final solution from an oracle.
Next, we show that the algorithm does not leak any information to servers (the search-
controller and the decryptors), i.e., all assignments look equally probable to be a solution
for a server, assuming that a server does not have any a priori knowledge of the problem.
This is quite obvious because variable values are randomly renamed by the permuta-
tions. The search-controller cannot know the actual original value it is selecting. Unless
all decryptors collude, decryptors cannot decrypt a constraint matrix directly. Although the
search-controller observes the search process in a depth-first search tree, this information
is useless for updating the estimated probability that a particular assignment is a part of the
final solution, assuming that the search-controller does not have any a priori knowledge
of the problem. More specifically, each node with depth k in a search tree corresponds to
a value assignment of k variables. The probability that a node in depth k corresponds to a
particular value assignment is 1/mk even after the search process is observed.
For example, let us assume the simplest case, i.e., there exist two variables x1, x2, whose
domain is {1,2}. When a solution, i.e., a terminal node in the search tree, is found, there are
four possible scenarios: (1) a solution is obtained immediately, (2) a solution is found after
changing x2’s value once, (3) a solution is obtained after changing x2 twice and performing
backtracking, (4) a solution is obtained after changing x2’s value twice and performing
backtracking, then changing x2’s value again. Regardless of which pattern is observed,
the terminal node can be either {x1 = 1, x2 = 1}, {x1 = 1, x2 = 2}, {x1 = 2, x2 = 1}, or
{x1 = 2, x2 = 2} and each of them is equally probable.
Please note that the search-controller might be able to learn general information on con-
straints, e.g., a constraint between a pair of variables looks tight, while another constraint
is rather weak. However, this information does not affect the estimated probability that a
node corresponds to a particular value assignment.
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The following alternative method for solving a secure DisCSP is possible.• The decryptors decrypt all constraint matrices and send the information to the search-
controller.
• The search-controller solves the problem alone without further communication with
decryptors and sends the value assignment to each agent.
If we can guarantee that the search-controller has no a priori knowledge of the prob-
lem and there is no collusion among the search-controller and the agents, this centralized
method also works. However, this centralized method is clearly vulnerable against collu-
sions. For example, assume the search-controller and agent i collude. Also, assume the
problem domain is meeting scheduling and all constraints are equality or inequality. Then,
the information of all permutations can be obtained by this collusion. Consequently, all
information of the problem and the obtained solution will be elicited.
On the other hand, if the decryptors do not decrypt constraint matrices directly, the
information obtained by the search-controller is limited. Even if the search-controller and
an agent collude, they cannot obtain the information of all permutations, thus the effect of
this collusion is much smaller.
So far, we assume these servers are passive adversaries, i.e., they try to obtain secret in-
formation based on the published information of the protocol but they perform the protocol
properly, i.e., they cannot actively manipulate the protocol. We can make a part of our al-
gorithm robust against active adversary, i.e., we can make it publicly verifiable by utilizing
zero-knowledge proof techniques. However, making the whole algorithm/protocol robust
would be rather difficult.
5.2. Communication costs
The search procedure of the secure DisCSP algorithm is equivalent to a standard chrono-
logical backtracking. The number of rounds, i.e., the number of times that the search-
controller and the decryptors exchange messages, becomes O(mn) in the worst case. For
each round, the search-controller sends/receives a message to/from each decryptor. There-
fore, if there are t + 1 decryptors, 2(t + 1) messages are communicated in each round. The
size of each message is equal to the bid length of p.
Whether the required communication costs for this algorithm are larger than those of
existing DisCSP algorithms [8,12,20,26–29] depends on the number of agents and decryp-
tors. If the number of agents is large while the number of decryptors is small, the required
communication costs of this algorithm can be less than those using existing DisCSP algo-
rithms.
6. Discussion
In most existing DisCSP algorithms, each agent exchanges a tentative value assign-
ment with other agents, and final value assignments are made public [8,26–29]. In [20],
an alternative formalization of DisCSP is presented in which variables and domains are
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common knowledge and constraints are private information. In the algorithm presented in
[20], agents obtain a solution by explicitly communicating information on constraints to
each other.
In [12], an algorithm called distributed forward-checking algorithm is presented in
which an agent communicates possible domains of variables that belong to other agents
rather than its own assignments, so that agents do not directly observe the value assign-
ments of other agents. However, in [12], encryption techniques are not used, so private
information is leaked during the search process.
Security issues in DisCSPs are discussed in [18,19,21]. In particular, a generate-and-test
type algorithm that utilizes a general-purpose multi-party protocol is presented in [18].
One promising application field of secure DisCSP algorithms is meeting scheduling. In
[3], the trade-off between the efficiency of an algorithm and privacy of agents in meeting
scheduling problems is discussed. In [9], a secure meeting scheduling protocol that utilizes
information security techniques is developed. However, this protocol is specialized for a
meeting scheduling problem in which only a single meeting is scheduled. By applying our
newly developed algorithm, multiple meetings can be scheduled simultaneously.
It is well known that any combinatorial circuit can be computed securely by using
general-purpose multi-party protocols [1,5]. Therefore, if we can construct a combinatorial
circuit that implements a constraint satisfaction algorithm, in principle, such an algorithm
can be executed securely (thus we do not need to develop a specialized secure protocol
for DisCSPs). However, implementing a combinatorial circuit that can execute a constraint
satisfaction algorithm is still an open problem, and the obtained circuit would be very large.
Note that we need to create a general purpose logic circuit to solve CSPs, not specialized
hardware to solve a particular problem instance (such as those discussed in [23]).
Furthermore, to execute such a general-purpose multi-party protocol, for each compu-
tation of an AND/OR gate in the circuit, the servers must communicate with each other.
Using such a general purpose multi-party protocol for a distributed constraint satisfaction
problem is not practical at all due to the required communication costs.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a secure DisCSP algorithm. Our newly developed algo-
rithm utilizes an indistinguishable, homomorphic, and randomizable public key encryption
scheme. In this algorithm, multiple servers, which receive encrypted information from
agents, cooperatively perform a search process and obtain a solution of a problem in which
variable values are renamed. Then, a part of the solution is sent to each agent. By using
this algorithm, the private information of an agent is not leaked during the search process
to other agents or servers.
In this paper, we developed an algorithm whose performance is equivalent to a basic
chronological backtracking algorithm as a first step in developing secure DisCSP algo-
rithms. Although the complexity of the obtained algorithm is still huge, this paper showed
an existence proof that we can, in principle, implement a protocol that does not leak any
private information on the obtained solution.
We hope to address the following issues in our future works:
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• analyzing the robustness of the developed algorithm against collusions of servers and
agents in more detail,
• evaluating the practical performance of the developed algorithm,
• developing new algorithms that are more computationally efficient and require less
communication costs,
• developing new algorithms that do not require a centralized third-party server like a
search controller.
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